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THE COLORED MAN STANDING BY
THE PUNCH BOWL
Prof. Michael K. Jordan *
Imagine attending a social gathering where there are a num-
ber of people who have never met. You are standing with a group
of friends, one of whom is attempting to describe an individual
standing across the room. Finally, your friend identifies the individ-
ual by saying the person he is talking about is the "colored man
standing by the punch bowl." My guess is you would experience a
significant level of discomfort. You might even wonder how any
friend of yours could use that term. Certainly the individual standing
by the punch bowl may be a person of color, but not a colored person.
However, I am old enough to remember when I and people who
looked like me were referred to as being colored, not of color,
black or African American. As best I can remember, the white peo-
ple who called me colored were not doing so in an intentionally
malicious way, I was simply a colored boy.
Many years ago, Althea Gibson andJackie Robinson broke the
color barrier in tennis and baseball. She was a colored tennis
player, he was a colored baseball player. I remember viewing in a
theaterJackie's biography and everyone, includingJackie, referred
to him as being colored. The application of the term colored to
Jackie and Althea seemed as natural then as its use now feels awk-
ward and embarrassing. For example, Tiger Woods is the number
one golfer in the world and has achieved demigod status in the
golfing world. The Williams sisters (Venus and Serena) are recog-
nized as being top tennis professionals. Before them, Arthur Ashe
enjoyed widespread success on the professional tennis circuit.
Clearly Tiger, Arthur and the Williams sisters have broken color
barriers in golf and tennis that were equally as daunting as those
faced by Jackie Robinson and Althea Gibson. Has anyone thought
of or referred to Woods or Ashe as being a colored golfer or tennis
player? Similarly, has anyone referred to the benefits and disadvan-
tages of affirmative action for colored people? Whatever strengths and
weaknesses this social program may possess, they are either enjoyed
* Michael K. Jordan is a professor of law at William Mitchell College of Law in St.
Paul, MN. Asst. Atty. Gen., Iowa Atmy. Gen. Off., Des Moines, 1981-83; Spec. Asst.
Atty. Gen., Minnesota Atty. Gen. Off., St. Paul, 1983-85; Labor Counsel, Northwest
Airlines, St. Paul, 1985-88. J.D., 1980, Iowa. A.B., 1975, Bowdoin College.
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or borne by black people or African Americans, not colored people.
This avoidance of certain racial terms in particular socio/historical
contexts is worthy of a great deal more thought than we give to it.
Instead of identifying something extant in the real world, use of
the term colored serves as a window through which others may
peer into you. Just as we have all stared, out of curiosity, at some-
one wearing dated clothing at an important social event, using the
term "colored" suggests something equally as peculiar about the
user of the term.
Thinking of Tiger as a colored golfer or how affirmative action
harms or benefits coloreds juxtaposes words and ideas that do not
seem to mesh. There is a certain racial dissonance created when we
think of a colored Tiger but not when we think about a colored
Jackie. There is disharmony between the racial group designation
(colored, black or African American) and the corresponding activ-
ity engaged in by the individual designated as colored. Quite sim-
ply, colored men and women cannot excel in golf today, but
African Americans, black people or people of color can.
Racial dissonance exists in other contexts as well. Consider, for
example, the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Missouri v.
Jenkins.' At issue in Jenkins was the legitimacy of a broad remedial
order issued in a school desegregation case. The Court held that
the district court exceeded its remedial powers when it issued the
order.2 Justice Thomas, however, examined what he thought lay
hidden beneath the order. The order was based upon tacit assump-
tions which were used by the district court when it assessed the
quality of predominately black schools. Thomas believed the judge
who issued the order assumed that a predominately black institu-
tion must be inferior to a racially integrated one.3 Students in pre-
dominately black schools simply could not obtain the same level of
instructions and educational success as they would have if they
were learning side-by-side with white students.4
1 515 U.S. 70(1995).
2 Id. at 100-02.
3 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114.
4 Id. at 121-22. It was reported that during the Justices' conference at which Jen-
kins was discussed Justice Thomas made a highly personal appeal related to his exper-
iences with segregated schools. In his experience the difficulty with segregation had
nothing to do with the absence of white students sitting next to him in the classroom.
The problem was that he and other students did not have equal facilities such as
heating, books and chairs. See Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta "Culture, Clarence
Thomas and Afrocentric Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 308, 318 (2000). Justice Thomas
expressed a similar sentiment in his concurring opinion in Adarand Construction Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Adarand involved a challenge to a federal highway con-
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This unexamined assumption invariably led to broad and erro-
neous judicial remedies. The judge ignored the real issue in the
case, which was what caused the segregated schools: intentional
acts by the state or something else which would be beyond the
reach of the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the judge could
not consider any proposition that equated black schools with edu-
cational excellence. Thomas, however, was willing to entertain pre-
cisely the opposite view. Historically black middle and high schools
as well as colleges have been symbols of excellence and are exam-
ples of institutions that "can function as the center and symbol of
black communities, and provide examples of independent black
leadership, success and achievement."5 Thomas was unrelenting in
his challenge to what he characterized as demeaning assumptions
about the ability of black students and a disregard of the historical
evidence demonstrating that blacks were capable of educational
success in predominately black schools. There is, however, another
aspect to this debate that is frequently missed and illustrates how
racial dissonance operates.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation6 the separation of the races was simply a social reality that
did not necessarily "stamp the colored race with a badge of social
inferiority."7 If the colored race is inferior it is not because of legis-
lation, rather the legislation simply acknowledges preexisting cir-
cumstances. The two races could not live together until they
developed a mutual appreciation of each other's qualities and
chose to voluntarily live together. Legislation could not mandate
this end.8 Brown gave us a new vision of the races and how they
could or could not live together. Segregation was no longer in the
struction program that awarded contracts based in part upon the race of the subcon-
tractor. The Court held that the federal program was subject to strict scrutiny analysis
notwithstanding the fact that the program originated with Congress rather than the
states. Justice Thomas characterized the program as involving racial paternalism. "So-
called "benign" discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with whites without their patroniz-
ing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alter-
natively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged
by the government and its use of race." Id. at 241. One clearly senses Thomas' belief
that the patronizing indulgence which produced the preference program in Adarand
was operating the same way in Jenkins and led judges to believe that black students
could not excel in school without the beneficial presence of whites. In both instances
it elevated whites to a position of power over blacks and underestimated the power of
blacks, given an equal opportunity, to fend for themselves.
5 Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
8 Id. at 551.
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nature of things; an outgrowth of the lack of mutual appreciation
of the qualities of each race. Instead, separation denoted a de-
graded state for blacks regardless of how objectively similar the cir-
cumstances may be for the two races.'
As with the difficulty of thinking about Tiger Woods as a
colored golfer, it is equally as difficult, according to Justice
Thomas, for judges to think of predominately black schools as be-
ing anything other than a badge of inferiority. Colored schools are
to segregated schools asJackie Robinson (a colored ballplayer) was
to baseball. Both are rooted in a particular view of the races, their
relationship with each other, and the social institutions created to
accommodate this social reality. In a post-Brown world it is difficult
to conceive of a predominately black school using pre-Brown cog-
nitive imagery.
This essay will explore racial dissonance and how it affects our
thinking about race relations and social policy in America. Why is it
we simply cannot or simply choose not to think of Tiger Woods as a
colored golfer or affirmative action as benefiting or harming
colored people? The answer lies in our conception of race and
how the meaning of that term changes. Moreover, no matter how
much we may think we hold a particular view of what race means
and how we apply that term in guiding us in our mundane activi-
ties, a deeper revelation about our views becomes possible only
when we apply our concept of race to shape social policy. As will
become clear, we often arrive at rational decisions about racial so-
cial policy that are chagrined by the extent to which our rational
choices are at odds with other deeply held yet less conscious as-
sumptions about race.
The first part of this essay will examine the concept of race.
Though we often think of race as delineating real characteristics
that exist objectively, race is actually a socially created abstraction.
In addition, how this abstraction changes over time will also be ex-
plored. This is simply another way of saying that, in America, the
term "colored people" has been replaced by the term "black peo-
ple." The difference between the two terms raises important ques-
tions about social policy. For instance, to what extent does
changing a racial term used to designate the same group of people
reflect actual changes in the group itself or attitudes towards the
group? If various terms represent specific attitudes it is a possibility
that social policy may be altered to reflect changing attitudes about
9 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
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the group. It is also possible that policy may be in conflict with the
terms used to define the racial group.
These possibilities suggest that it is useful to explore the con-
nection among racial terms, social change and social policy. I will,
therefore, explore in broad terms what it means to be colored in
America and how the Civil Rights Movement of the 50's and 60's
replaced the term "colored" with the terms "African-American"
and/or "Black." We know the two are different since a "colored
man" can no longer stand by a punch bowl. The question is what is
the difference and how does that difference shape race relations
and social policy. Specifically, why is it difficult to formulate a social
policy, such as affirmative action, and apply it to the needs of
colored people, but less difficult if we apply it to black people?
RACE
There is a tendency to think of racial terms as having a perma-
nent meaning. Race refers to a group of individuals who exist in
the real world and possess certain attributes which determine how
group members will interact among themselves and with members
of different groups (races). Colored people is, therefore, a concept
that has meaning because it accurately represents properties and
relations existing objectively in the real world independently and
beyond the control of the individual who uses the term. Since
these concepts represent objective reality they are amenable to ma-
nipulation through our powers of reasoning. When we unleash our
power of reasoning on racial terms we are engaging in the rule
governed by manipulation of symbols or concepts to depict the
proper (objective) relation between symbols and the objects these
symbols represent. Moreover, by rationally manipulating these
terms, we acquire a better understanding of the world. 0 For simi-
lar reasons, the term racism acquires a fixed meaning. One can
identify a racist by comparing his/her conduct and attitudes to a
list of observable behaviors, patterns of thoughts and attitudes that
have been objectively determined to represent racist attitudes or
10 This is similar to what the expression "thinking like a lawyer" means. "Thinking
like a lawyer" includes a particular type of relationship between mind, language and
reality. When one thinks like a lawyer, one is manipulating objective transcendent
principles which are reflected in the law. This process is value-free and is not sub-
servient to any particular political or social objective. See Michael Jordan, Law Teachers
And The Educational Continuum, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 41, 52 (1996). Similarly, racial
terms reflect reality in the same way that thinking like a lawyer reflects transcendent
realities that are free of individual manipulation and control.
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conduct."
Now recall the colored man at the punch bowl scenario. There
are many of you who almost instinctively label the person using the
term colored as being at best ignorant, at worst racist. This conclu-
sion was arrived at by referring to a list of behaviors which identi-
fies racist behavior. On that list was an item such as: Referring to a
member of a racial group, other than your own, in a derogatory fashion.
However, what was the derogatory term used? The statement de-
scribed a visible characteristic which was useful in identifying the
stranger, yet few would deny the unsettling affect that hearing the
term colored man would have on the gathering. However, the term
colored did not always have this negative affect on people. Who
would question the long history of the NAACP's active leadership
in the fight for civil rights. Yet, this is the National Association for
the Advancement of COLORED PEOPLE.12 Certainly this organiza-
tion was not racist, therefore, the use of the term colored does not
necessarily denote a racist attitude. It appears that despite our be-
lief in the fixed objective reality that racial terms are presumed to
represent, these terms are neither fixed nor firmly rooted in
rationality.
What then is the real problem posed by the colored man at
the punch bowl? That is, how is it that an objective term describing
people and an attitude towards them can be both fixed and objec-
tive yet also seem to vary in meaning over time. Pursuit of the an-
swer must begin with a willingness to lessen our hold on the notion
that the concept of race and/or racism is rooted in a timeless and
objective reality that exists apart from the social context in which
these ideas are created and expressed. We make sense of the world
by using culturally constructed and shared meanings about the
world around us. These are not fixed ideas that remain constant
over time. Instead, these are ideas that we assimilate and are often
unaware of, yet they shape not only how we see the world but how
we express our understanding of the world to each other." Race is
I See Michael Jordan, The NLRB Discrimination Decisions, 1935-1964: The Empiric
Process Of Administration And The Inner Eye Of Racism, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 55, 67 (1991).
12 The number of excellent studies on the history and protest activities of the
NAACP are too numerous to list. See, e.g. HARRY ASHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGS
(1997); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-1963
(1988); HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL A HISTORICAL ANALY-
SIS OF THE FAILURE OF BLACK LEADERSHIP, (1967) [hereinafter Cruse, The Crisis];
DAVID J. GARRoW, BEARING THE CROSS MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986).
13 See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension Of The Agon Between Legal Power And
Narrative Meaning 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2225, 2230-35 (1989) [hereinafter Winter] ("Cen-
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a culturally shared concept used to explain observable differences
between groups of people. Physical differences are imbued with
cultural meanings, which are embraced as signifying objective real-
ity apart from the very culture that created the meaning of the
term. Race is, therefore, a "folk classification" in that it presents
popularly held beliefs about human differences. It is generated by
"the ideologies, distinctions, and selective perceptions that consti-
tute a society's popular imagery and interpretations of the
world."1 4 Folk classifications organize our experiences into a seam-
less coherent whole which explains and justifies social experiences
and social policies. 5
Science was also instrumental in shaping our erroneous view
of race as being a natural phenomenon that exists in the real
world. Scientific inquiry is nothing more than a way of knowing
and understanding the world that excludes supernatural and mysti-
cal explanations. This type of understanding is based upon empiri-
cal knowledge objectively acquired through the human senses and
mechanical techniques that enhance the senses. Inquiry is guided
by uniform formal procedures that are free of individual manipula-
tion or idiosyncratic standards of validity.' 6 Unfortunately, science
was not always free of supernaturalistic or ideological influences. 7
The study of race is an example of one of the less than successful
attempts of science to free itself from the influence of supernatu-
ralistic definitions and explanations of race. Science as well as the
popular mind was held captive by folk classifications of race.
Rather than subjecting popular conceptions of race to rigorous,
uniform, and value-free analysis, science sought to justify them. 8
tral to the intellectual process is the construction and sharing within a culture of
idealized cognitive models... to structure and make meaningful regular aspects of our
daily experience. These are like "stock stories" or "folk theories" by which humans in
a given culture organize the diverse inputs of daily life into meaningful gestalts that
relate that which is "relevant" and ignore that which is not."). See generally MARKJOHN-
SON, THE BODY IN THE MIND THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON
(1987); GEORGE LAKOFF AND MARKJOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1980) (discuss-
ing human meaning, understanding and rationality).
14 AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH AMERICA ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF A
WORLDVIEW 27 (1999) [hereinafter Smedley]. See generally THOMAS GOSSETr, RACE THE
HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1997); IVAN HANNAFORD, RACE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN
THE WEST (1996) (discussing the history of race).
15 Id. at 26-27.
16 Id. at 153.
17 Id. at 152-55.
18 Science filled the void left when the church and bible were no longer used as
the authoritative sources to explain the world generally and race specifically. How-
ever, science did not totally reject the preexisting social and theologically based as-
sumptions which helped to explain the world. "These assumptions related to the
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Our thinking about race feels so natural and objective because of
our belief that there is some measure of scientific validity which
supports it. After all, we can observe differences between groups of
people, so there must be some objective reason for these differ-
ences and rational inferences to be drawn from them.
In this regard, science became a form of storytelling; it recog-
nized and responded to the behavior and feelings of individuals as
they addressed problems posed by their culture. The appeal of sci-
ence was its ability to provide culturally acceptable interpretations
of seemingly natural phenomena. The scientific study of race is
better understood as a mode of analysis more familiar to the hu-
manities, involving metaphor and archetype." - The goal was to pro-
vide scientific answers to social and moral questions such as how
does one justify mistreating groups of people because of the color
of their skin and texture of their hair.
20
Of course, culturally based explanations of the world change;
race is not an exception to this principle. This does not mean that
cultural creations, such as folk classifications, can change in virtu-
ally unlimited ways simply because they are not constrained by ob-
jective rules. Folk classifications - definitions of race - change but
change is limited and shaped by the very culture that generated the
concept. 21 For example, we know that the term colored at one time
underlying cosmological and ideological themes of European cultures, specifically
those values, beliefs, and "revealed" knowledge about God, nature, the world and
humankind. In its early stages, the Judeo-Christian idea of a single creation and the
Noachian explication of human diversity were some of the main survivals of Biblical
thought in Science. Their persistence was based on unquestioning acceptance of the
scriptural representation of human beginnings." Smedley, supra note 14, at 153.
19 Metaphor and archetype are better understood as the tools of imaginative litera-
ture rather than rational scientific inquiry. These tools are used to describe the behav-
ior and feelings of people as they live through and reflect on problems created by
their cultures. In literature, unique interpretations are given to events and these inter-
pretations are supported with evidence that cannot necessarily be proved or dis-
proved. The appeal of the metaphor and archetype is found in their language, depth
of interpretation and consistency with accepted morals and values. "There are no
critical tests to confirm or falsify them. There are no natural laws from which they are
derived. They are bound by time, by situation and above all by the cultural prejudices
of the researcher or writer." NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE
TO TECHNOLOGY, 154 (1993).
20 Id. at 161-62.
21 See Winter supra note 13, at 2244-45. Many have noted the erroneously held
assumption that racial classification and racism disappear when terms or ideas used to
describe a race in an offensive and oppressive manner are no longer in use. For exam-
ple, there are few who would attempt tojustify the separation of the races based upon
biological differences between the races. However, the abandonment of biological
justifications does not necessarily signify the elimination of racism, but it does signal a
change in the justification for discriminatory treatment. See, e.g., ROBERT L. ALLEN,
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was an acceptable way to refer to a group of people but is now an
inappropriate way to refer to the same group. This is an example of
social change constrained by culturally based rather than objective
rational rules. In the next section I will examine the different
meanings associated with specific racial terms such as colored and
black,2 2 but initially I will briefly focus on the process of social
change.
When we think of social change as it relates to race relations,
most of us will have visual images, at least those of us who were
born in the late forties or early fifties. Fire hoses, marches and the
"I Have A Dream" speech by Martin Luther King are the visual
images that mark swift and dramatic change in race relations. If,
however, we are to deepen our understanding of racial changes
and what effect those changes have on social policy, we need to
broaden our view of the forces of social change to include the less
dramatic. Long before Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat to a
white person on a bus in Montgomery Alabama, colored people
were defiantly refusing to submit to the indignities visited upon
them whenever they engaged in the simple activity of riding a pub-
lic bus.2" It is far easier to recognize change after the fact than
when it is happening. The tendency is, therefore, to associate
RELUCTANT REFORMERS RACISM AND SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
255-277 (1974);James M. Blaut, The Theory Of Cultural Racism, 23 Antipode: A Radical
Journal Of Geography 289-99 (1992); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Ra-
cial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 12-20 (1999) [hereinafter Rush, Racial
Goodwill].
22 The terms colored and black are being used to signify specific views about race,
however, it is not being argued that these two terms are not connected to each other.
As described earlier, race is a folk classification not a scientific one. It is a dynamic
concept that is subject to fluctuations in its expression and interpretation. Contradic-
tions and inconsistencies may exist at any given time and two different racial terms
may not be mutually exclusive. See Smedley, supra note 14, at 27. One should not,
therefore assume that my use of the terms colored and black signify two mutually
exclusive racial views. They describe dominant characteristics found in the category
that developed in response to prevailing social forces. Colored did not necessarily
displace black. The process is better understood as one where additional ideas about
race were added to our popular view of race. The two views may even blend were they
are not inconsistent. Thus, it is possible for elements of black to exist in colored and
elements of colored to exist in black. See also Robert Gordon Critical Legal Histories 36
Stan. L. Rev. 57, 116-18 (1984) (structures of thought do not necessarily prescribe
particular social outcomes but do offer a range of meanings and interpretations to
use in interpreting social events and explaining historical events).
23 See ROBIN, D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS: CULTURE, POLITICS AND THE BLACK WORK-
ING CLASS Chap. 3 (1994) [hereinafter Kelly, Race Rebels] (working class struggle
against segregation in public spaces goes unnoticed because it was unorganized and
represented individual acts of defiance against authority and a demand for dignity
and respect).
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change with certain easily recognized events. Every school child in
America knows that the civil rights movement began with Rosa
Parks. Unfortunately this tends to associate social change with the
actions of specific groups engaged in consciously planned actions
directed at specific social conditions. 4 We then assume there is a
direct causal chain linking the deliberately organized action and
the resulting change in the laws and racial attitudes.
While this is one way in which change occurs along the racial
frontier, it is not the only method. This perspective on social order
is a top-down view. Well organized, powerful social and political
groups recognize a problem, respond with a rational social and/or
political agenda and conditions and ideas change, more often than
not, for the better.25 There is another perspective: the bottom-up
view. It starts within individuals and emanates out to interaction
among individuals, small groups, communities then regions. This
view is at least as valid as the top down approach and in many re-
spects is a more accurate view of racial change in America.2 6
24 The civil rights movement is frequently associated with middle class blacks and
their demand for equal opportunity. Few scholars recognized the spontaneous acts of
resistance of the black working and lower classes because it was neither organized nor
accepted as legitimate by black leaders. For these leaders, the role models for proper
behavior were supplied by middle class blacks. id. at 3-6 and Chap. 4. See also DAVID
HALERSTAM, THE CHILDREN 63-74 (1998) [hereinafter Halberstam, Children].
25 In the civil rights movement this view is best represented by the NAACP. During
the early part of the movement the NAACP was a well established bureaucratic organi-
zation that functioned on the basis of order and predictability. This strength was also
a weakness in that it became difficult for the organization to respond to spontaneous
grass roots mass action. The result was a conflict between local southern communities
that wanted to plan and organize action locally and the centralized northern based
leadership of the NAACP. SeeALDON MoRIus, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE Xi-Xii, Chap. 3 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Morris, Origins]. In response to this conflict there was a tendency for locally based
organizations to ignore the NAACP and focus upon the direct participatory action of
members of the local black community. These organizations tended to rely on preex-
isting local leadership and social institutions. See id.; Halbertstam, Children supra note
24, at 215-19; RICHARD KING, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE IDEA OF FREEDOM Chap. 6 (1992)
[hereinafter King, The Idea].
26 In retrospect there is a tendency to only examine the civil rights movement's
affect on the legal and social order of America. What is forgotten is that the move-
ment began with the transformation of individuals. The most basic element of the
movement was a new sense of self development by black people. There was a demand
for respect from whites and a feeling of empowerment based upon the overt demand
and actions taken to enforce the demand. This is bottom up change because it began
with a change in how blacks thought about themselves and interpreted social exper-
iences. In fact, it can be argued that the entire history of the struggle for freedom by
blacks has been one characterized by individual acts of resistance which were later
followed by collective action. See VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER-THE BLACK
STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA Chap. 5 (1981) [hereinafter Harding, The River].
This is not to deny the significance of collective action. However, it underscores what
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The distinction between the two approaches is significant be-
cause of the folk classification nature of race. Race is a deeply held
cultural construct that is not necessarily subject to conscious ra-
tional control and manipulation. It is, therefore, possible for one
to consciously act in a way that is consistent with rationally held
beliefs, yet one's conscious actions and rational thoughts are at
odds with one's deeply held cultural assumptions about race. This
is why top-down views of social change fail to capture significant
aspects of social change. Well organized group actions may be pre-
ceded by significant less visible, but no less significant, attacks upon
the underlying culturally based conception of the problem. What
we see are highly visible social policies and we assume these poli-
cies and their advocates must have caused the change. In fact, the
policy is a manifestation, not cause, of the change. Conversely, a
social policy or movement may fail because of its inability to con-
sider the existing context in which it must be applied. It may make
rational good sense, but is inconsistent with deeply held cultural
perspectives about the nature of the issue being addressed by the
policy.
27
This starts to sound similar to the reaction one has to hearing
Tiger Woods referred to as a colored golfer or affirmative action
working against the interests of colored people. It is dissonance,
but now we can be a bit more specific about its source. It is the
disjuncture between the way we consciously and rationally think
about race and the deeply held beliefs about race which we hold
and upon which we act. In the case of Tiger Woods we know ration-
ally that he is a gifted athlete in a sport that excluded people with
brown skin. These descriptive facts are inconsistent with referring
to Tiger as colored. Colored signifies something beyond facts and
rational discourse. Similarly, affirmative action is easily described
precedes collective organized action: individuals deciding to transform themselves
then communicating these views and feelings to others in an effort to interpret their
experiences and arrive at a common conception of self and the actions which need to
be taken in response to these new conceptions. Moreover, I am not arguing that the
two approaches are mutually exclusive. It is possible for the two types of change to
support each other. See generally ANTHONY COOK, THE LEAST OF THESE RACE, LAw, AND
RELIGION IN AMERICAN CuLTUma Chap. 5 (1997) [hereinafter Cook, The Least]; Kelly,
Race Rebels supra note 23, at 74-5, Chap. 4; King, The Idea supra note 25, at 4-9,
Chaps. 2, 3; Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, The Atlantic Monthly May 1999,
at 55, 76-77.
27 See generally Morris, Origins supra note 25, Chap. 11 (the success of the civil
rights movement is found in its reliance upon traditions norms, institutions, and re-
sources in the community rather than the rejection of these resources in favor of a
spontaneous outpouring of emotion in a largely unplanned and irrational response to
the social system).
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in social and legal terms that do not seem to fit the deeply held
conception of what colored means. A top-down policy, such as af-
firmative action, just does not mesh with the visceral response
evoked by the term colored.
The next section will explore this conflict between rationally
held beliefs about racial social and governmental policy and tena-
ciously held cultural constructions of race. Two folk constructions
of race need to be explored: colored and black. Exactly what do
these terms mean to us and why is it difficult, if not impossible, to
use these terms interchangeably?
COLORED
Colored people were created in the post Civil War South. For-
mer slaves faced legally sanctioned acts of discrimination and vio-
lence. In this context, colored people -former slaves-faced the
daunting task of carving out a place for themselves in a society
where many doubted their ability to be productive members of so-
ciety. Colored, therefore, became a racial classification shaped by:
the abolition of slavery; whites doubting the ability of the former
slaves to function as self-sufficient rational human beings; and the
desire of former slaves to demonstrate their ability to survive and
flourish using their new found freedom.2" It was presumed that for-
mer slaves were incapable of building communities and sustaining
themselves in these communities without the helping hand of for-
mer slaveholders.29 In effect, colored people carried the burden of
proving their humanity by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.3"
Booker T. Washington epitomized what colored meant. As a
28 See generally Emic FONER, RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-77 Chap. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Foner, Reconstruction].
29 See Harding, The River supra note 26, at 260, 297 and Chap. 14.
30 This burden can be seen most clearly in the Black Codes which rigidly pro-
scribed and prescribed certain behaviors for colored people. A failure to follow this
regime could result in criminal sanctions. See Foner, Reconstruction supra note 28,
199-201, 208-9. The Codes, therefore, exemplify Justice Harlan's notion of the social
disutility of erroneous outcomes. The standard of proof adopted in establishing the
existence of particular facts will affect the frequency of erroneous factual findings and
conclusions. Thus, the choice of the standard of proof reflects an assessment of the
comparative social disutility of the outcome. In the criminal context, there is more
disutility in convicting an innocent person than there is in letting a guilty person go
free. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-72 (1970). In the post-Civil War South, plac-
ing a high burden of proof on former slaves was a clear indication of how dubious was
the propositions that colored people were as human as whites and could be useful
members of society. They had to be controlled in every aspect of their lives. The
harmful consequences of mistakenly thinking otherwise posed unacceptably high
risks for whites and society.
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leader, his power lay in his ability to understand his own times and
express the aspirations and dreams of those whom he led. His un-
derstanding of "colored" led him to endorse social policies and a
code of individual behavior that was rooted in his and his follow-
ers' vision of how colored people could survive in America and
meet their burden of proof." For Washington, the best way to
meet this burden was with deeds. His vision of economic self suffi-
ciency3 2 was a social and political agenda which directly responded
to the conception of race held by white people. Economic self suffi-
ciency proved the worth of colored people by transforming them
through the creative activity of work. Through the acquisition of
skills and material goods colored people would challenge whites'
definition of them.
Washington's Atlanta Exposition speech, in September of
1895, is perhaps the most concise statement of the meaning of be-
ing colored in America. 3 He did not equate being colored with an
acceptance of racial exclusion and oppression of colored people in
the South. Instead, he addressed the burden of proof borne by
colored people. For Washington, full citizenship was the ultimate
goal of colored people but the road to it had many hurdles. Com-
petency was proven by developing manual skills and a trade, rather
than by holding a political office. By dutifully following a code of
individual behavior rooted in hard work and capital accumulation,
colored people believed they could demonstrate their ability to
meet and exceed standards endorsed by whites. The focus of this
approach was not on the fairness of the burden. Colored people
were as certain of the injustice of the burden they bore as whites
were of its validity. Instead, colored people turned their attention
to developing what they viewed was necessary to satisfy their bur-
den of proof: individual initiative, character and responsibility. An
injustice committed against them because of their race became the
backdrop against which individual fortitude and worth would be
demonstrated. Moreover, social integration with whites was secon-
dary to proving that one was worthy and competent: "[i] n all things
that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet as the
hand in all things essential to mutual progress."
3 4
31 See MANNING MARABLE, BLACK LEADERSHIP FOUR GREAT LEADERS AND THE STRUG-
GLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS xi-xvii (1998) [hereinafter Marabel, Black Leadership].
32 See generally VICTOR ANDERSON, BEYOND ONTOLOGICAL BLACKNESS 66-70 (1995);
FRANKLIN, LIBERATING VISIONS supra note 26, at Chap. 1; MARABLE, BLACK LEADERSHIP
supra note 31, at Chap. 3.
33 BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, Up FROM SLAVERY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 143-46 (1999).
34 Id. at 145.
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Washington combined his understanding of colored with a
prescription for social policy towards colored people. His now fa-
mous "cast down your bucket" metaphor was more than a colorful
rhetorical device; it was a clever way of introducing a racial-prefer-
ence policy. "To those of the white race who look to the incoming
of those of foreign birth and strange tongue and habits for the
prosperity of the South, were I permitted I would repeat what I say
to my own race, 'Cast down your bucket where you are.' -5 His plea
was, however, an appeal to rational self interest rather than racial
justice:
Cast down your bucket among those people who have, without
strikes and labor wars, tilled your fields, cleared your forests
build [sic] your railroads and cities... Casting down your buck-
ets among my people, helping and encouraging them as you are
doing on these grounds.. .you will find that they will buy your
surplus land to make blossom the waste places in your fields.
.. While doing this, you can be sure in the future, as in the past,
that you and your families will be surrounded by the most pa-
tient, faithful, law-abiding, and unresentful [sic] people that the
world has seen.
36
Buckets were not cast down to cure current or past acts of ra-
cial discrimination; 37 rather, the act served the economic interests
of whites. Colored people could be loyal employees or strike break-
ers: a guarantee that would not be given by immigrants. His pos-
ture on these issues also explained the avid support he received
from white capitalists.38 Washington's understanding of what it
meant to be colored and the social policies he advocated,
dovetailed into each other. Colored people sought to prove their
worth through the following: adhering to a rigid code of personal
discipline; living a life of exemplary rectitude; developing indus-
trial skills; and capital accumulation. Whites would then have ob-
jective evidence of colored people's skill, loyalty and humanity.
Affirmative action in this context amounted to nothing more than
an opportunity to demonstrate competence and value to white
people by adopting the values of the middle class and protecting
white-industrial interest from the raising tide of labor unrest in the
North and South.
35 Id. at 144.
36 Id.
37 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469, 498-507 (1989) (race
may be used in governmental decision making when it remedies current or past acts
of discrimination against the race favored by the decision).
38 Marabel, Black Leadership supra note 31, at 32-33.
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Washington recognized that if colored people were to be the
beneficiaries of the largesse of whites, there had to be a shared
definition of what colored meant which would then justify, perhaps
compel, whites to address the social conditions of coloreds. The
starting point for this definition was specifying characteristics of
the group which defined the group and delineated the problems
to be addressed. These characteristics may be cultural, behavioral
and/or, as in the case of coloreds, racial in origin. Regardless of
the characteristics' origin, resources are mobilized and allocated
pursuant to a conscious and rational social or governmental policy
to address the problem. The policy is held together by its pre-
sumed rationality and the worthiness of the subjects of the policy. 9
Moreover, a group, in this instance colored people, does not have
to be powerful to be the subject of beneficial social programs. In
other words, it does not have to coerce whites to act, but it must be
willing to endorse to some degree the prevailing definition of the
group's attributes which justify the social policy. For colored peo-
ple the key attribute was an absence of abilities believed to be nec-
essary for moral and economic development. The acceptance of
the need to develop these abilities led to policies that focused on
assisting this powerless group.40 Hence, the power of the "cast
39 Public policy is often viewed from the perspective of who wins and loses from
the particular allocation of resources. What is frequently overlooked is the extent to
which policy is shaped by the social construction of the population targeted by the
policy. This construction represents the cultural characterizations or popular images
of the persons or groups whose behavior or well-being is targeted by the policy. In its
simplest form the targeted population is believed to have shared characteristics that
distinguish it from other groups and these characteristics are believed to signify cer-
tain values or images. In essence these are stereotypes created by culture, politics
and/or socialization. Moreover, both the nature of the construction and the policy
implemented in response conveys messages to the targeted population. It informs
them of their status and the types of behavior that is expected from the group. See
Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, Social Construction Of Target Populations: Implica-
tions For Politics And Society, 87 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REvIEw 334, 335-41
(1993). See also LAuRA DUDLEYJENKINS, IDENTITY AND IDENTIFICATION: AFFIRMATWVE Ac-
TION IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES Ch. 1 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, Madison) (on file with the William Mitchell College of Law
Library).
40 Schneider & Ingram, supra note 39, at 337-39. This is not meant to suggest that
colored people "accepted" these definitions as being totally accurate. Some may very
well have. However, the point here is to note the extent to which a policy was built
upon a particular definition of what colored meant and the burden of proof which
colored people carried. The issue here is not fairness, rather it is the extent to which
these policies were rooted in particular views about colored people and the extent to
which the policy encouraged and rewarded certain types of behavior. The reward was
clearly intended to shape the view that colored people had of themselves. Id. at 340-
41. The level of the influence is subject to debate, but that the policy did in fact have
an effect is beyond debate. Cf King, supra note 25, at 4-9 (the mass action civil rights
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down your buckets" metaphor. Colored people accepted their
need to develop the desired traits (thus acknowledging at some
level that they were absent) and whites would offer a helping hand
in providing the opportunity and material resources to assist
coloreds in acquiring these traits.
This process also demonstrates the difference between top-
down and bottom-up social change and how the two can be used in
constructing social policy. Notice how Washington placed the bur-
den upon colored people to transform themselves inwardly, as in-
dividuals, then outwardly to small groups within the colored
community. Social change began with a code of personal moral
and economic conduct. What followed was the social policy that
recognized, supported and capitalized upon the personal meta-
morphosis. It all started though, with the individual and his willing-
ness to bear up under the burden of accepting Washington's code
of behavior. This is bottom-up social change.
While it is beyond the scope of this essay to engage in an in-
depth comparison of the views of Washington and his contempo-
rary W. E. B. DuBois, a brief word is in order because the two men
presented opposing views of colored people. Dubois is commonly
viewed as the more radical and prescient of the two leaders; he
anticipated and laid the ideological groundwork for what we have
come to know as the civil rights movement. Washington's racial
conception is viewed as an aberration from Dubois' now widely en-
dorsed positions on race and the struggle for racial equality. Unfor-
tunately, this position is based upon 20/20 hindsight and, more
importantly, overestimates Dubois' political power and misinter-
prets his relationship with colored people.
Washington wielded a great deal more political power than
Dubois, and this difference can be traced to Washington's ability to
control the patronage of industrial philanthropists. It was Washing-
ton who attended high profile meetings with national political
leaders, not Dubois. His message of hard work was geared to the
needs of the masses of colored people struggling to survive in the
South. 41 His concern was the immediate material needs of colored
people and what colored meant to both colored and white people.
He has been described as an intercessor between his group and
whites: one who demanded less for colored people than whites had
movement created a new sense of self and personal responsibility which was contrary
to the preexisting view of blacks as being powerless).
41 Marabel, supra note 31, at 23-33.
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already conceded.4 - One may argue over the effectiveness of this
approach, but it undeniably represented an accurate understand-
ing of what colored meant. Intercession accepts the power differ-
ential between colored and white people and limited colored
people to petitioning for the opportunity to demonstrate compe-
tence. An intercessor passionately urges one to "cast down his
buckets" and does not demand anything as a matter of right. The
one who responds to the entreaty does so based upon the sincerity
and moral force embodied by the plea, not its stridency. In effect,
Washington was the personification of bottom-up change.
Dubois, on the other hand, was an intellectual. His view of
what colored people needed extended well beyond the acquisition
of political rights and material well-being. Colored people needed
to search for their identity in their own cultural heritage. The arts
and literature were tools to be used by colored people to free
themselves from an identity created for them by white people.43
Dubois assailed the meaning of colored as a cultural phenomenon
and advocated for the redefinition of race based upon the exper-
iences and culture of colored people. As an intellectual, his task
was to develop and articulate the consciousness of so called
colored people. Given this task he stood at the periphery of society
and the masses of colored people.4'
Washington's power lay in his ability to articulate and reflect
current racial definitions and respond with a social agenda that
matched those definitions. It is his vision of colored that mirrored
the contemporary cultural meaning of race. Dubois' vision of race
42 Id. at 35.
43 Id. at 43-47. In this regard Dubois is atypical of black civil rights leaders who
tend to view the race issue in economic and political terms. See Cruse, supra note 12,
at 92 ("From the black point of view, the Negro intelligentsia does not comprehend
the strategic importance of the cultural front in relation to the political and economic
fronts .... They do not see that a truly pragmatic economic and political program
cannot be put into motion in the United States unless it is simultaneously linked to
the cultural front.").
44 Dubois was not, therefore, what Antonio Gramsci would view as a traditional
intellectual. Traditional intellectuals "are directly involved in the production and re-
production of ideological forms that reinforce domination by the classes that control
political and economic power. Part of their responsibility is to socialize successive gen-
erations to accept the dominant ideology and power relations with the existing social
order." Marabel, supra note 31, at 98. DuBois was an organic intellectual. "In contrast,
organic intellectuals emerge from the most oppressed and exploited social classes and
groups within society. They generally articulated the consciousness of their classes in
politics, in social relations and within the economy. Because their connections with
the elites who control the economy or dominated governmental institutions are tenu-
ous or even nonexistent, their objective class position is implicitly or explicitly in di-
rect conflict with the dominant powers." Id. at 99.
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was that of a forward looking intellectual seeking to reshape the
debate over the meaning of race and racial equality, based upon
the social and cultural history of colored people. Perhaps the best
way to understand the two men is not to focus on their differences,
for in the final analysis they both aspired to achieve the same thing:
the full participation of colored people in American social and po-
litical life. It was their immediate interests that were different.
Washington committed himself to developing an immediate sur-
vival strategy while Dubois sought to create a new language for
colored people to use in defining for themselves what colored
should mean for themselves and whites.
BLACK
At some point during the mid-Twentieth century, colored peo-
ple began to disappear and black people began to emerge. The
difference between the two groups is best understood by examin-
ing the significance of the civil rights movement. The imagery of
the movement is indelibly etched in our consciousness: the "I Have
A Dream" speech, marches, bombings and civil rights legislation.
The permanence of the images suggests to us that their resonance
was uniformly and universally experienced by the nation. We for-
get, however, that our interpretation of the movement is influ-
enced by our definition of race and the movement is, therefore,
subject to various interpretations over time. just as colored could
not be understood apart from the post-Civil War experience of
freed slaves, black cannot be comprehended apart from the social
landscape that existed during the mid 50's to late 60's. The quest
for racial equality and the meaning of race intertwined with other
culturally based beliefs, one of which is the ideology of social pro-
gress. The transformation of America from a legally segregated so-
ciety to an integrated one mirrors the presumed general
movement of civilization in general, and America in particular,
from belief in myth to enlightenment, ignorance to knowledge and
superstition to reason. Race mirrors this transformation by having
its meaning move from an archaic irrational (folk) definition, to-
wards a rationally based one geared to the needs of an egalitarian
society. This is progress engendered by conscious rational control
of behavior. It has a momentum of its own which cannot be im-
peded by the idiosyncratic will of individuals.45
45 See Michael Jordan, From The Constitutionality Of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances To A
Children's Agenda For The 1990's: Is It Really A Simple Matter Of Supporting Family Values
And Recognizing Fundamental Rights ?, 5 St. Thomas L. Rev. 389, 429 n. 148 (1993) ("The
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The dominant image of the Civil Rights Movement is that it
responded to a higher calling. In the realm of the sacred, it repre-
sented individual transformations based upon the ideas of brother-
hood and the Judeo-Christian heritage of love and human
dignity.4" The secular side of the movement represented another
step in the inexorable evolutionary progression towards a society
constrained by rationality and individual merit rather than irra-
tional racial classification. What in fact occurred was not an elimi-
nation of irrational racial classification, rather the content of the
classification changed. Initially, the essence of the Civil Rights
Movement was a battle to rebut the idea that colored people were
not fully human. This was accomplished through deeds which sig-
nified one's economic competence and moral rectitude. Black was
rooted in precisely the opposite notion. There was a presumption
of humanity and innate human equality. Black was a demand not
an entreaty. It demanded that whites face their own moral failings
and give way to the force of social progress and our Judeo/Chris-
tian heritage. Social reform in this instance gathered its strength
from confidence in the power of the individual, morality and the
inevitability of progress.
As with Washington's colored people, the early phase of the
civil rights struggle was an example of bottom-up change: it re-
duced social change to an individual struggle. Adherence to a per-
sonal code of moral behavior was necessary to illuminate the dark
side of America's moral duplicity, and as with Washington's ap-
proach, visible public action was necessary to signify the inner
transformation that was occurring. The direct action movement il-
lustrates this most clearly. The existence of organizations such as
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People has led to the
meaning of race has been grafted onto other central cultural images of progress, so
that the transition from segregation to integration and from race consciousness to
race neutrality mirrors movements from myth to enlightenment, from ignorance to
knowledge, from superstition to reason, from primitive to the civilized, from religion
to secularism, and most importantly, the historical self-understanding of liberal soci-
ety as representing the movement from status to individual liberty.").
46 See VINE DELORiA JR., GOD Is RED A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 48 (1994) ("The
Civil Rights movement was probably the last full-scale effort to realize the avowed
goals of the Christian religion. For more than a century, the American political system
proclaimed the brotherhood of man as seen politically in the concepts of equality of
opportunity and justice equally administered under the law. Equality under the law,
however, was a secularized and generalized interpretation of the Christian brother-
hood of man, the universal appeal of individuals standing equally before God now
seen as people standing equally before the law and secular institutions."). See generally
Cook, supra note 26, at Chap. 4.
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mistaken belief that there existed a centralized command structure
that dictated local strategy. In fact, the movement was indigenous
and decentralized. Colored people were transformed into black
people because of the institutions, customs and beliefs that existed
in their communities and interpreted social reality. For blacks this
meant the church and a history of interpreting the struggle for
freedom as requiring individual action and responsibility.4 7 Moreo-
ver, the response of whites was equally decentralized. Individual
whites were confronted with the behavior of colored people that
was inconsistent with how colored people were supposed to be-
have. There was no entreaty "to cast down buckets." Instead, there
were the individual and group confrontations challenging the pre-
vailing view of race. Blacks were not attempting to rebut the pre-
sumption of inhumanity which Washington focused on; they were
telling whites that by creating and believing in the presumption
whites were offering prima facie evidence of their own immorality.
Equal opportunity became the phrase that characterized this
shift from colored to black. It captured the degree to which
America had betrayed its core values of individualism and self de-
termination. One's success or failure should reflect one's ability to
compete for limited opportunities under conditions of fair compe-
tition. In this regard, the movement was built upon the corner-
stone of modern liberalism. Its focus was not upon equality of
results in the competition for limited resources; instead it focused
upon the fairness of the process by which the results are derived."
Black people wanted nothing more than individuality. They
wanted to be freed from a racial classification that ignored individ-
ual worth and uniqueness in favor of an all encompassing and op-
pressive definition of race. The movement, therefore, operated at
two levels. For the individual it was a struggle for racial equality and
a challenge to any notion that race imposed a burden on individu-
als to prove their moral worth. On a larger scale it was a step for-
ward in the evolutionary process by which America evolved towards
a more enlightened and rational society. Both levels began and en-
ded with the individual and his determination to transform
America through his life and actions.
This view changed dramatically. It became apparent that
equality in competition would not remedy the unequal conditions
47 See King, supra note 25, at 94-99; Morris, supra note 25, at 5-7.
48 See Cook, supra note 26, at 6-8; JAmEs S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY,
AND THE FAMiLy 1-2 (1983) [hereinafter Fishkin, Equal Opportunity]; Vincene Ver-
dun, If The Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis Of Reparations To African Americans, 67 Tul. L.
Rev. 597, 619-22 (1993).
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that necessarily influenced the results of the competition. With the
development of an individual identity came the burden of being
held personally responsible if one did not succeed in competition
with others. It was this difficulty that the civil rights movement and
whites began to face. If one were committed to fair competition
among equals it became increasingly difficult to ignore the effect
that years of oppression had upon the ability of blacks to com-
pete.49 The result of this type of competition was predictable and
presumably the prediction could be made based upon skin color.
Affirmative action was born out of this realization. The focus was
no longer on individuals and procedural fairness in competition.
Outcomes became the touchstone by which we measured whether
racial discrimination continued to exist.5 °
AFFIRMATIVE AcrION
Much has been written about the legal, philosophical and so-
cial justifications of affirmative action. My focus is on where this
essay began, the folk classification nature of race; the popular be-
liefs about and explanations of differences between people based
upon race. With the advent of the civil rights movement and the
disappearance of colored people it was tempting to believe that
racial classifications had or were in the process of disappearing.
This sanguine perspective is consistent with our belief that America
is moving towards a more rational society that has eliminated social
classifications rooted in ignorance. Unfortunately, the civil rights
movement did not eliminate folk-based views of race; it simply ad-
ded new images to the popular conception of it.
Recall the colored man at the punch bowl scenario. What is
shocking, perhaps embarrassing is a better word, about the state-
ment is its use of a term that seems inappropriate in the post civil
rights movement era. "Colored" is associated with a time when
colored people were presumed to be morally and socially incompe-
tent, they had to prove their humanity and value to white Ameri-
cans. Thus, by referring to a "colored" man in the room the person
was invoking racial imagery that presumably did not survive the
49 See Desiree Kennedy, Radicalism, Racism And Affirmative Action: In Defense Of A
Historical Approach, 27 Cap. U. L. Rev. 61, 62-64 (1998 ); ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-
BLIND CONSTrrUTION 184-191 (1992); Rush, supra note 21 at 21-24; Verdun, supra note
48 at 629-39; Leland Ware, Turning Back The Clock: The Assault On Affirmative Action, 54
Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 5(1998).
50 See Nathan Glazer, WE ARuE ALL MULTicUL-URALISTS Now 11-13(1997) (explain-
ing the difference between multiculturalism and affirmative action with its current
emphasis on quotas and timetables rather than adding diversity in society).
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Civil Rights Movement. The important point to remember is the
discomfort caused by the use of an anachronistic term to describe
race rather than the use of a racial term. A "colored" man at a
punch bowl signifies both location in a room as well as the compe-
tency and character of the person. We do not refer to Tiger Woods
as "colored" because "colored" carries the presumption that
colored people do not possess the skill and intelligence necessary
to play a white man's game. Jackie Robinson was a "colored" base-
ball player because he was in the process of challenging the pre-
sumption that was firmly entrenched and had yet to be rejected.
This does not mean, however, that racial folk classifications
have ceased to exist; their content has simply expanded to include
new images, ones that may be no more rational than those already
included in our prior conception of race. We have not evolved to
the point where race ceases to be a major tool in defining social
reality in the popular mind. The existence of affirmative action
programs is evidence that racial folk classifications are alive and
well in America. Affirmative action is nothing more than a social
program based upon a particular conception of race. It represents
as much a social policy rooted in particular beliefs about race as
Washington's call to "cast down buckets." The difference is that
Washington's policy was accepted because it was consistent with the
prevailing conception of race; by contrast, affirmative action is
neither accepted nor consistent with our conception of race. It is a
top-down policy solution to a problem that historically has been
viewed as a bottom-up issue.
As explained earlier, social policies implemented for discrete
groups of people are driven by specific conceptions of a group's
characteristics and the problems created by those attributes. With
colored people, the question was what policy was appropriate for a
group of people who were presumed to be morally and socially
inferior. For Booker T. Washington, the solution was for colored
people to request a limited opportunity to overcome the presump-
tion of inferiority through deeds and adherence to a rigid code of
moral and capitalistic behavior. The policy matched the prevailing
sentiment (folk classification) about the meaning and significance
of race. However, affirmative action, is a policy that is not in step
with the prevailing conception of race. The current view was
shaped by the civil rights movement with its focus on the individu-
ality of black people; the elimination of the burden of proof borne
by colored people; and the obligation of whites to follow a political
and spiritual higher calling. At the outset of the civil rights move-
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ment colored people demanded justice based upon the argument
that the moral and legal trajectory of America was towards a pre-
sumption of competence and the moral worth of all people, re-
gardless of race.
Affirmative action reintroduces race but from a different di-
rection. Compensatory action is now taken due to incompetence
that is rooted not in genetic racial differences but socially imposed
burdens. Being black became the factor which explains one's social
circumstances and outlook in the same way that being colored had
been indicative of one's incompetence and subhuman status: skin
color continued to denote social status and explain one's social cir-
cumstances. What changed during the post-civil-rights era was the
belief that we can rationally distinguish between the two definitions
and uses of race. Colored was indicative of one's inhumanity only
because of the ill-founded and unscientific views of whites. Now,
however, we know that any negative aspects to being colored can
be traced to the socio/cultural disadvantages resulting from dis-
crimination. Unfortunately, what many fail to notice is that race is
still being used in both instances to understand and explain the
actions of individuals. For colored and black people there devel-
oped a consensus on race as a trait that identifies a group subject
to corrective governmental policies. The group members have at-
tributes which are in need of remedial action and the group is also
deemed to be deserving of the necessary intervention.
It is easy to articulate rational distinctions between the differ-
ent uses and meanings behind the terms "black" and "colored."
Unfortunately, folk classifications are neither rationally based nor
subject to logical control and modification. We may reason our way
to a position where we comprehend the difference between disabil-
ities imposed on a group because of race and disabilities caused by
race, but it is too fine a line to be drawn in the realm of folk classifi-
cation. The controversy over affirmative action is evidence that
race-based thinking is alive and well and not as easily manipulated
or eliminated as policy makers would have us believe. The empha-
sis is on which folk classification of race shall be used, not whether
the use of any racial classification is appropriate. Thus, there is lit-
tle reflection over the larger question of the extent to which any
commonly used racial classification represents a social construction
of reality, rather than an accurate, value-free objective depiction of
reality. Black is as much a socially created concept which matches
particular social policies as colored matched others. The former
requires affirmative action the later the casting down of buckets.
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There are additional dangers present. Colored people did not
necessarily disappear with the appearance of black people. What
occurred was that additional popular conceptions of race were ad-
ded to our store of racial images and definitions used to explain
the behavior and circumstances of groups. Colored people could
surge once again to the forefront of the popular conception of
race if they offered a better explanation of social conditions or pol-
icies implemented in response to current social issues. 51 Both black
and colored are concepts, not concrete things. They ebb and flow
according to their ability to offer explanations for difficult issues
that are not necessarily subject to rational control and explanation.
Finally, affirmative action is also a top-down policy, which rests
upon our assumptions about the evolutionary process by which
America is moving towards enlightenment and rational control of
society and ourselves. Once the need for a policy such as affirma-
tive action was logically assessed, it was imposed upon others based
upon a loose consensus among policy makers and social activists.
This was done because of their deeply held faith in their ability to
control and predict the outcome and effects of remedial policies.52
Presumably, everyone would eventually comprehend the necessity
and wisdom of the policy and those who did not were racists or
unenlightened. In effect, those at the top were waiting for every-
one else to become more rational and abandon primitive notions
about race in favor of an enlightened and modern perspective
about the needs and justified demands of black people.
This is not meant to suggest that anyone opposed to affirma-
tive action is a primitive racist, or that a supporter of it is a progres-
sive thinker. The point is that beneath the legal and social
arguments garnered for or against the program are folk concep-
tions of race that are never fully acknowledged. It is difficult for us
to think of a social program aimed at a particular racial group with-
out also invoking the full panoply of popular conceptions of that
group that have ever existed. Our current popular conception of
race (black people) was drastically altered by the civil rights move-
ment and subsequent events such as the black power movement
with its emphasis on black nationalism and its justification of the
use of violence.5" As a result, affirmative action simply does not fit
our current popular conception of race. It is no longer deemed
51 See Smedley, supra, note 14, at 27; Gordon, supra note 22, at 116-18, and supra
note 22 accompanying text.
52 See generally THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPEC-
TIVE ch. 5 (1990).
53 See generally STOKELY CARuICHAEL AND CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE
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fair to presume nonwhites are incompetent. White America is be-
lieved to have faced its betrayal of our liberal Judeo-Christian heri-
tage by denying the humanity of colored people. America is
believed to be moving through its evolutionary progression towards
a more open and rational society. Colored people have disap-
peared. In their place, we have black people who do not need af-
firmative action because this program is inconsistent with a society
that views itself as having achieved rationality and equal opportu-
nity. Finally, blacks are more assertive, even strident, and America
is not going to give anything to a strident race. Things are given
("buckets cast down") to those who are deemed humble and ac-
cepting of their inherently diminished status. If affirmative action
does not fit our image of blackness, we may find ourselves resorting
to former conceptions of race that offer a more satisfying interpre-
tation of remedial programs such as affirmative action.
CONCLUSION
I recognize that my views are easy prey for the charge that I
want blacks to return to the good old days when we were less de-
manding, passive and appreciative of what little favors whites would
do for us in the name of charity. When I was a kid during the early
60's being colored was being an Uncle Tom. I am not an Uncle
Tom. The issue is not whether I, or anyone else, has a particular
view of race. We all do whether or not we are willing to admit it.
What is important is that we should not deceive ourselves into
thinking that anyone of us has a rational and objective view of race
that exists outside of the social context in which we live. That is, we
can simultaneously use race and transcend it so that we achieve a
social condition where race represents an eternally accurate repre-
sentation of reality. The last time this belief was held, it was called
scientific, and later, discredited. Yet, we still believe that we now
have a clearer understanding of race, since older scientific claims
about race have been exposed, once and for all, to have been
fraudulent. However, this view will invariably lead us to repeating
previous errors. That is, after exposing the fallacy behind previous
false and invidious conceptions and uses of race, we now have the
true meaning of race at our disposal for use in constructing our
social reality. In effect, we know now what race really means to us.
We are now as certain about what black means as we previously
were certain about what colored meant. With this certainty we are
POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967); THEODORE DRAPER, THE REDISCOVERY OF
BLACK NATIONALISM ch.8 (1970); King, supra note 25, at Chap. 6.
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ready to make the social world over in this new flawless racial im-
age. This certainty, perhaps hubris is a better word, needs far more
scrutiny than what has been applied to it.
We pose the greatest threat to ourselves when we believe that
it is possible for a society to evolve to a point where it is capable of
possessing a high degree of insight into social problems and with
that insight construct solutions based upon value-free criteria. We
know what is correct because of our belief that an objective view of
history demonstrates certain values and views of race to be more
enduring and beneficial. Social problems and the race issue are
then reduced to technological rather than ideological issues. Af-
firmative action owes its origin, in part, to this view. After decades
of racial conflict and debate, we believe we have a more insightful
and less dangerous view of what race does and does not mean. It is
now possible to think logically about it and derive policies free
from older, less objective belief systems. The controversy over af-
firmative action demonstrates that, even assuming we can reach
that point in America, we are not there now.
Affirmative action rests on two fallacies. First, it is believed that
since America is moving along the path of progress and away from
invidious biologically based views of race, it is now possible to have
benign race-based programs. This would be a program based upon
an accurate rational conception of what race really means. The
problem is that there never has been a time when contemporary
social thinkers and policy makers did not believe that they also had
the real meaning of race, only to later discover that they were
wrong or racist. That is why Booker T. Washington went from be-
ing a powerful leader to an Uncle Tom- from a paladin and leader
of colored people, to a betrayer of black people. Race is, and always
will be, a social construct, devoid of any inherent meaning and fil-
led only with the significance that our culture and history ascribe
to it. A value free racial category is an oxymoron.
The second fallacy is a corollary to the first. A social program
based upon race can survive based simply upon our rational belief
that it is a good thing even though the program is inconsistent with
the very assumptions undergirding the program. No matter how
much affirmative action may have been viewed as the right thing to
do, it simply ran afoul of what "black," as opposed to "colored,"
means in America. Perhaps Justice Thomas is correct in being
skeptical about race-based social policy. However, a better way of
understanding his skepticism is to recognize that racial categories,
when used for any purpose, call forth every popular conception of
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race we have ever used in our culture. We have not evolved to the
point of eliminating a particular view of race; we simply emphasize
some aspects over others. Affirmative action calls forth former con-
ceptions of colored people on the one hand, and on the other, the
presumption of incompetence which they worked so arduously to
rebut. This stock racial image was not eliminated, it was simply
overshadowed by black people, their heroic struggle for individual-
ity, and their demand for respect.
No matter how much affirmative action may make rational
sense, it opens the door for the reintroduction of colored people,
not through a conscious choice, but simply because these are the
limited and crude tools at our disposal when we think about race.
That is, the popular mind may believe that we need affirmative ac-
tion because colored people really could not rebut the presump-
tion that was placed on them. Conversely, black people may resent
accepting popular definitions of race in a vein similar to that of
how colored people accepted buckets that were cast down based
upon dehumanizing assumptions held by whites. They may disa-
gree with the popular assumptions justifying the policy but accept
it to the extent necessary to keep the policy going and receive some
measure of benefit from it. We are not moving towards tran-
scending racial categories when we use affirmative action, we sim-
ply become more firmly mired in them. As long as we see a colored
man, black man, or man of color standing by the punch bowl, we
will carry race as a societal millstone which we will bear but cannot
fully control or comprehend.

